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Mechanism design
Results: 750

#	Item
241	Strategyproof Mechanisms for Competitive Influence in Networks Allan Borodin Mark Braverman Add to Reading List Source URL: www2013.wwwconference.org Language: English - Date: 2014-07-21 08:47:04 Game theory Submodular set function Price of anarchy Mechanism design Reduction Algorithm Mathematics Academia
242	On the Impossibility of Black-Box Transformations in Mechanism Design Shuchi Chawla∗ Nicole Immorlica† Add to Reading List Source URL: www.immorlica.com Language: English - Date: 2014-01-01 20:44:16
243	Encyclopedia of Algorithms DOI8_787-1 © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015 Reducing Bayesian Mechanism Design to Algorithm Design Yang Caia , Constantinos Daskalakisb and Matthew Wei Add to Reading List Source URL: people.csail.mit.edu Language: English - Date: 2015-07-20 23:20:41
244	Behavioral Mechanism Design: Optimal Crowdsourcing Contracts and Prospect Theory DAVID EASLEY and ARPITA GHOSH Cornell University Incentives are more likely to elicit desired outcomes when they are based on accurate mod Add to Reading List Source URL: www.sigecom.org Language: English - Date: 2015-07-13 06:51:51
245	Algorithmic Game Theory∗ Tim Roughgarden† May 12, 2009 1 Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2010-06-29 12:48:05 Game theory Theory of computation Mathematics Theoretical computer science Algorithmic game theory Price of anarchy Algorithmic mechanism design Mechanism design Approximation algorithm PPAD Epsilon-equilibrium Computational complexity theory
246	UTILITARIAN MECHANISM DESIGN FOR MULTI-OBJECTIVE OPTIMIZATION∗ FABRIZIO GRANDONI† , PIOTR KRYSTA‡ , STEFANO LEONARDI§ , AND CARMINE VENTRE¶ Abstract. In a classic optimization problem the complete input data is a Add to Reading List Source URL: people.idsia.ch Language: English - Date: 2014-04-28 11:16:59
247	Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design: Motivation, Examples, and Lessons Learned TIM ROUGHGARDEN Stanford University This survey describes the approximately optimal mechanism design paradigm and uses it to investigate Add to Reading List Source URL: sigecom.org Language: English - Date: 2014-12-16 17:33:19
248	Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design: Motivation, Examples, and Lessons Learned TIM ROUGHGARDEN Stanford University This survey describes the approximately optimal mechanism design paradigm and uses it to investigate Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2014-11-26 15:35:14 Mechanism design Game theory Auction theory Auctions Decision theory Gaming Vickrey auction Auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Virtual valuation Random-sampling mechanism
249	The Sample Complexity of Revenue Maximization Richard Cole ∗ Tim Roughgarden † Courant Institute Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2015-11-25 19:06:52 Mechanism design Auction theory Auctions Game theory Probability distributions Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction Auction Virtual valuation Valuation Distribution Exponential distribution
250	Barriers to Near-Optimal Equilibria Tim Roughgarden Computer Science Department Stanford University Stanford, CA, USA Email: Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2014-08-06 18:53:57 Game theory Price of anarchy Approximation algorithm Mathematical optimization Epsilon-equilibrium Congestion game Optimization problem Computational complexity theory Nash equilibrium Mechanism design

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